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Abstract— Several research groups are working on designing 
new security architectures for 4G networks such as Hokey and 
Y-Comm. Since designing an efficient security module requires 
a clear identification of potential threats, this paper attempts to 
outline the security challenges in 4G networks. A good way to 
achieve this is by investigating the possibility of extending 
current security mechanisms to 4G networks. Therefore, this 
paper uses the X.805 standard to investigate the possibility of 
implementing the 3G’s Authentication and Key Agreement 
(AKA) protocol in a 4G communication framework such as Y-
Comm. The results show that due to the fact that 4G is an 
open, heterogeneous and IP-based environment, it will suffer 
from new security threats as well as inherent ones. In order to 
address these threats without affecting 4G dynamics, Y-Comm 
proposes an integrated security module to protect data and 
security models to target security on different entities and 
hence protecting not only the data but, also resources, servers 
and users.  
Keywords- 4G systems, IEEE X.805, AKA protocol, 
Integrated Secuiry Layers, Targeted Security Models 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
  Due to some security weaknesses in 2/2.5G networks and 
the need to support voice and data transmission, third 
generation (3G) networks have been recently deployed. 
     Aside from supporting multimedia communication [3], 
3G-based technologies, e.g., Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) [4], [1] provide new 
services such as location dependent services, which along 
with the support of voice and high quality video traffic are 
the major innovations, compared to 2G technologies [3]. 
Furthermore, 2G’s main security weaknesses have been 
tackled in 3G systems; a more generic Authentication and 
Key Agreement (AKA) method has been developed. In 
addition, integrity and stronger encryption mechanisms have 
been introduced. 
     However, due to the increasing demand for ubiquitous 
connectivity and service provision, there is growing 
momentum to move towards Beyond 3G or 4G 
communication systems.  
     4G networks represent an open environment where 
different wireless technologies and service providers share 
an IP-based core network to provide uninterrupted services 
to their subscribers with almost the same quality of service 
(QoS). In 4G systems, mobile devices are expected to 
switch between networks of different operators and 
technologies; this is referred to as vertical handover and it is 
required to maintain the Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
needed by their applications. 
     A proposal of a 4G architecture is the Y-Comm 
framework [7][8], which is been developed by a number of 
institutions. Y-Comm details the functionalities and 
mechanisms required to support heterogeneous networking.   
     It is no longer the case that security for communication 
frameworks is considered as an add-on rather than a 
fundamental issue. Future communication systems consider 
security from the initial stages of the design process. This is 
reflected in the design of 4G architectures such as Y-Comm 
where security is considered as an integral part of the 
design. However, in order to develop an efficient security 
module, it is necessary to identify the threats and risks faced 
by communication systems. But since analyzing security 
requirements of communication systems is quite complex, 
the ITU introduced a systematic analysis tool called X.805 
[9] as a holistic approach to network security by discussing 
systems security requirements at different levels and 
pinpointing potential network vulnerabilities [9].   
     In this paper, we examine whether it is possible to use 
3G security mechanisms such as AKA for 4G systems such 
as Y-Comm. The X.805 framework will be used to validate 
the AKA mechanisms on Y-Comm, hence revealing what 
additional security measures are needed to secure 4G 
systems.  The rest of the paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 describes the architecture of the X.805 standard. 
Section 3 explains the AKA protocol of 3G networks. 
Section 4 introduces the Y-Comm framework as an example 
of 4G networks while Section 5 proposes deploying the 
AKA protocol with Y-Comm; this proposal is analyzed 
using the X.805 standard in Section 6. The results of the 
analysis are summarized in Section 7. Section 8 introduces 
related work to enhance security in 4G systems, and then the 
paper concludes in the final section. 
 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE X.805 STANDARD 
     As described in [9], the X.805 standard proposes three 
security layers (applications, services and infrastructure), 
three security planes (end user, control and management) 
which are identified based on the activities performed over 
the network, and eight security dimensions to address 
general system vulnerabilities (access control, 
authentication, non-reputation, data confidentiality, 
communication security, data integrity, availability, and 
privacy). 
     Figure 1 shows the complete architecture of the X.805 
standard including Security Layers, Planes and dimensions. 
     The security layers of X.805 standard have already been 
applied to different communication systems such as WiFi, 
ATM and IP-based networks [11] [9] respectively. 
III. THE USE OF THE AUTHENTICATION AND KEY 
AGREEMENT (AKA) PROTOCOL IN 3G NETWORKS 
     This section describes in some detail the AKA protocol 
[1] used in 3G networks.  The AKA protocol follows the 




Figure 1. The X.805 standard architecture [10] 
 
Table I.     AKA Steps in 3G networks 
 
Steps Actions Description 
1 
           MS 
               
Sign-on                           
  
BSc1/ SRNC1 
Initial stage, the message 
includes Mobile Station’s 
(MS) security preferences is 
sent to the Base Station 









BSc1 consults the Serving 
GPRS Support Node/ Visitor 
Location Register 
(SGSN/VLR) whether to 
allow MS to join or not 
3 
 




          HLR 
VLR1 asks the Home 
Location Register  (HLR) to 
send a set of security 
parameters attached to MS 
4 
 
HLR      Ki     AuC 
 
SV generating using 
the F1-F5 functions 
 
HLR gets the key Ki from the 
Authentication Server (AuC) 
and uses it along with other 
parameters [1] to generate a 
Security Vector (SV) using  
F1- F2 functions   
5 
         HLR     
                           










     RAND & AuTN   
 
            MS 
 
VLR1/SGSN1 sends a  
random value (RAND) and 
authentication token  (AuTN) 




between the network 
and MS 
MS compares the re-
generated SV’s parameters to 






             MS 
BSC/SRNC sends back an 
integrity protected list of 
MS’s security preferences 
 
 
 Although weaknesses have been shown on the basic AKA 
protocol improvements such as X-AKA and EAKAP 
[12][5], these weaknesses were not related to the basic 
architecture of the AKA protocol, but rather  to the 
underlying functions used to achieve some security aspects. 
Therefore, many projects such as the Third Generation 
Partnership Project 3GPP project [13] use this protocol for 
network-level security. 
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Figure 2. AKA architecture for 3G network 
IV. INTRODUCTION TO Y-COMM 
     As previously mentioned, Y-Comm is an example of a 
4G system. The complete structure of Y-Comm is shown in 
Figure 3.  
     A very detailed explanation of the Y-Comm design is 
given in [7] and [8]. For Y-Comm to support mobile-
initiated vertical handover, four layers are mainly 
concerned: in the peripheral framework we have the Policy 
Management Layer (PML) which helps the mobile device 
to decide when and why to handover as well as the Vertical 
Handover Layer (VHL) which is responsible for initiating, 
executing and terminating handover procedures.  While in 
the Core framework we have the Network Management 
Layer (NML) that maintains all neighbouring networks 
characteristics and the Reconfiguration Layer (REL) 
which manages and controls network entities and resources 
to accommodate the handover.  
      The Y-Comm architecture in the core network is 
distributed and hence we can map into 3G/ UMTS 
infrastructure as shown in Figure 4. 
     
 
Figure 3. Y-Comm architecture [8] 
 
       However, it should be emphasized that Y-Comm is a 
4G system and hence it supports several different wireless 
systems simultaneously. Hence Y-Comm supports different 
types of MSCs / SGSNs in addition to using media-
independent handover mechanisms such as IEEE 802.21 
[17] to support vertical handover. 
It has been shown that the aforementioned AKA protocol 
is adequate for 3G based networks, this is due to a set of 
issues related to the architecture of the network. However, 
due to 4G networks’ new features (all IP-Based connections, 
heterogeneous environment controlled by different 
operators), new mechanisms are proposed to support 
functions such as Vertical Handover. In fact, there is a need 
to cope with the complexity, openness and dynamics of 4G 
networks. Therefore, deploying current security mechanisms 
with future 4G networks is still an open question. 
V. AKA PROTOCOL WITH Y-COMM 
     This section proposes an AKA protocol based on [1] to 
be deployed with Y-Comm in order to protect the network 
resources while performing a vertical handover [7]. In this 
example, MSC1/SGSN1 and SRNC1 represent the first 
network, while MSC2/SGSN2 and SRNC2 represent the 
second. By building on the mobile–initiated mobility model 
proposed in [14], AKA might be implemented as follows 
(see Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 4. Mapping Y-Comm onto Mobile Infrastructure [14] 
 
 
MS     SRNC1   SGSN1        CEP     SGSN2           HLR    AuC 
 
 
             
 
      1-Probing 
 
 2-Sign-on message  
 
                           
                                                     3- Looking Up 
                                                      4-SV  
                        
                                 5,6- HoAck 
 
 
Figure 5. 3G-AKA in the Y-Comm 
 
1.      It is assumed that the MS has already joined a 
network and has been authenticated and has agreed 
with the network on the set of keys. The MS probes 
the network management layer (NML) in the core 
network to know about available networks [14]. 
2.      Based on the characteristics of neighboring 
networks, the Policy Management Layer (PML) of 
the MS decides the target network [14]. 
3.     The MS sends a sign-on message to the Core-
endpoint specifying the target network; this 
message contains the MS’ unique identifier and 
Key Set Identifier (KSI) which identifies the set of 
keys (CK, IK, AK) already established and used 
with the current VLR (VLR1). 
4.      When SGSN2/VLR2 receives the sign-on 
message, it checks with HLR to authenticate the 
MS and gets the corresponding security vector 
(SV). If the Lease Time field (LT) of the MS’ 
security vector (SV) is about to expire (beyond a 
threshold, e.g., 80% of the time elapsed), HLR and 
AuC generate a new Security Vector for the MS to 
be used in the new network (SGSN2). HLR sends 
(SV) to SGSN2/MSC2/VLR2 thus the MS is 
authenticated and authorized to use the network. In 
the case where LT is above the threshold, there is 
no need to re-generate a new set of keys. 
5.      MSC2/SGSN2 informs BSc2/SRNC2 of the 
handover and asks it to reserve a channel for the 
Mobile device. Once a channel is allocated, 
SRNC2 acknowledges that back to MSC2/SGSN2 
which passes it to Core End- Point (CEP). 
6.      CEP sends Hand Over Acknowledgment 
(HOAck) message to the MS. 
7.      The MS needs to authenticate the new network 
(MSC2/VLR2). Therefore, once the MS joins the 
network, SGSN2 sends a challenge message 
containing the new AuTN and RAND (AuTN2, 
RAND2). MS follows the same procedure to verify 
the network Sequence number and MAC, and 
authenticate the network. 
VI. ANALYSIS OF AKA ON Y-COMM USING THE X.805 
STANDARD 
     In this section we apply the X.805 standard to analyze 
the performance of the AKA protocol, proposed in a 
previous section. 
     Since AKA protocols aim to provide network-level 
security, the functionality of this set of protocols is only 
related to the Infrastructure Layer of the X805 standard 
which is concerned with the security of network links and 
elements. 
     As previously mentioned, each layer is decomposed into 
three planes and for each plane the following eight 
vulnerabilities corresponding to the security dimensions of 
X.805 are examined as shown in Figure 6.   
 
 Infrastructure layer 
Management Plane Module One 
Control Plane Module Two 













Figure 6. X.805 standard for the AKA protocol 
 
     The Management plane is represented as Module 1, the 
Control plane is represented as Module 2 and the User plane 
is represented as Module 3.  In the table below, each 
vulnerability is analyzed relative to Module 1, 2 and 3. 
     The remainder of this section discusses the security 
dimensions for each of the three modules 
 
Table II.     Security vulnerabilities for each module        
 
Vulnerabilities Modules Involved 
Access Control 
 
Modules 1&2 : no access 
control mechanisms such as 
Access Lists (ACLs) or Firewalls 
are applied to restrict the access to 
network resources 
Module3: Users’ access 





Modules 1, 2 & 3: AKA 
protocol provides mutual 
authentication between the mobile 




Modules 1,2 & 3: since AKA 
protocol uses symmetric key-
based mechanisms, non-
repudiation is not provided 
Data Confidentiality 
 
Modules 1, 2 & 3: data 
confidentiality for the connection 
between the mobile device and 
the MSc/SGSN is achieved using 
Cipher Key (CK) and F6 function 
as an encryption algorithm [1]. 
However, no encryption is done 




Modules 1 & 2:  no specific 
security mechanisms are proposed 
to protect the data transmitted in 
the core network as it is 
considered physically secure. 
Module 3: from a user 
perspective, once authentication 
and key agreement processes are 
done, the security of the wireless 




Modules 1, 2 & 3: AKA 
provides  Data Integrity by 
implementing Integrity Key (IK) 
and Hashing algorithm (F7) for 
the MS- MSc/SGSN  connection
Availability 
 
Module 1, 2 & 3: no specific 
mechanisms such as intrusion 
detections/protections are 
implemented to ensure network 
elements and services are 
available [9] and to make sure that 
network resources are immune 
against denial of service attacks. 
Privacy 
 
Module 1, 2 & 3: although 
confidentiality is achieved by 
using encryption, there is no 
guarantee that subscribers’ 



















The 8 Security Dimensions are applied to each module 
VII. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
     The key vulnerabilities indicated by this work include 
access control, communication security, data confidentiality, 
availability and privacy. These vulnerabilities are not seen 
in 3G networks because the network infrastructure is wholly 
owned by the network operators and access is denied to 
other network entities. However, such assumptions are no 
longer valid in 4G systems and therefore must be addressed 
in the proposed security architecture.  
     Moreover, since 4G is an IP-Based environment, it will 
suffer from most of the IP-specific security vulnerabilities 
found in the Internet. Our experience of the Internet as the 
best example of a successful open architecture has taught us 
that it is not sufficient to only protect data but it is also 
necessary to protect entities from each other (DoS, Spam) 
and also to protect the network infrastructure. Hence 4G 
systems must also address these concerns.  
VIII. OUR APPROACH 
To address the security threats of 4G networks without 
affecting its openness, a multi-prong approach is required.  
In this section, we examine a new approach based on the 
concepts of an Integrated Security Module (ISM)  to protect 
data and Targeted Security Models (TSMs)  which are 
needed to protect entities, such as users and servers that are 
using  the open infrastructure. 
A.  Integrated Security Module (ISM) 
The different vulnerabilities outlined in the previous 
section point to the need to tackle these issues in an 
integrated fashion instead of using multiple uncoordinated 
actions. In addition, a framework such as Y-Comm allows 
us to integrate different security features with the variuos 
layers of the architecture. Furthermore, because Y-Comm 
consists of two frameworks, we must consider how the 
security of a given layer is mapped onto both frameworks at 
the same time, as shown in Figure 7. Our security module 
comprises the following layers: 
1) Service And Application Security (SAS):  
a) On the peripheral networks: Provides AAAC 
functions  and authenticates the user to use the mobile node. 
b) In the core network: SAS decides which services 
should be installed on a specific peripheral network and 
authenticates the users that can use this service. 
2) QoS Based Security: Looks at QoS issues, e.g., 
Service Level of Agreements (SLA), network overloading 
and Denial of Service Attacks (DoS) in both the core and 
peripheral networks. 
 
3)  Network Transport Security (NTS): 
a) In Peripheral networks: NTS is concerned with the 
access and visibility of end devices to the Internet. 
b) In Core network: NTS is involved in setting up 
secure tunnels between core network endpoints. 
4) Network Architecture Security (NAS): It defines the 
security issues and threats resulting from moving to a 
particular network type.  
B. Targeted Security Models (TSMs) 
In addition to the ISM, we need targeted security models 
to protect entities in the system.  As mentioned in the 
previous section, it is not sufficent to only protect data but it 
is also necessary to protect the entities that use the open 
architecture from attacking each other and/or network 
infrastructure. TSMs are security models based around 
protecting a specific entity from being abused or attacked by 
other entities such as users in an open architecture. This is a 
new concept which we believe is necessary to provide  a 
completely secure environment. 
We have identified three security models that need to be 
developed, the first is called the connection security model 
which controls the connection between users and thus 
prevents a user from arbitrarily sending an unsolicited  
message to another user, e.g., Spam. 
The second security model is concerned with restricting 
access to servers by introducing the concept of a scope. This 
is an enhancement of the “Off By Default” [20] proposal. So 
users can only access the server when they are in the same 




Figure 7. Y-Comm complete  architecture [7] 
 
 Examples of scopes are Local: only a process on the same 
machine can access this server, LAN: only machines on the 
same LAN can access the server, Domain: only machines on 
the same domain can access the server, and finally Global 
where the service is globally accessible. We believe that this 
mechanism will greatly reduce Denial of Service attacks on 
offered services without limiting access to key parts of the 
infrastructure.  
The final security model is for facilitating secure vertical 
handover and attempts to prevent network resources from 
being abused and overloaded.  This is done by monitoring 
resource requests and ensuring access to vulnerable 
components does not exceed the available QoS. This model 
therefore makes use of the mechanisms in the QBM layer of 
the ISM. We are working on these models. 
IX. RELATED WORK: 
     The IETF handover keying working group (HOKEY 
WG) [18] is currently working on a new mechanism to 
support inter-technology handover which deploys the 
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [19] to support 
handover key distribution. We are exploring how we might 
use this mechanism in our secure vertical handover model. 
X. CONCLUSION: 
     In this paper we have demonstrated that the security 
requirements for 4G systems are much greater than those of 
3G. A lot of this is due to the fact that in 4G systems we 
require a more open architecture with its inherent security 
vulnerabilities compared to the closed network of 3G 
systems. These requirements clearly indicate that we need 
an integrated security module to protect data across different 
networks and in addition, we need targeted security models 
to protect various entities:  users, servers and network 
infrastructure. 
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